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Résumé : Dans les réseaux Wi-Fi, nœuds mobiles rivalisent pour l’accès au canal partagé
par un protocole à accès aléatoire, appelé Distributed Coordination Function (DCF), qui
est équitable à long terme. Mais les récents pilotes permettent aux utilisateurs de configurer
les paramètres de protocole différemment de leurs valeurs standard afin de violer l’équité du
protocole et d’obtenir une partie plus grande de la bande passante disponible au détriment
des autres utilisateurs. Cela motive un’analyse fondée sur la théorie des jeux.
Des études antérieures ont déjà modélisé l’accès à un canal sans fil partagé en termes
de jeux non-coopératifs entre les nœuds, mais ils ont surtout examiné le mode de fonc-
tionnement ad hoc. Dans ce papier, nous examinons le rôle du Point d’Accès (AP) dans le
mode de fonctionnement infrastructure, afin d’atténuer ou décourager tels comportements
malveillants. Nous résolvons un problème de conception des mecanismes incitatifs, à cette
fin nous utilisons l’AP en tant que coordinateur du réseau, pour encourager stratégies des
nœuds qui maximisent une fonction d’utilité globale. Nous analysons à la fois le scénario de
trafic unidirectionnel et bidirectionnel (liaison montante et descendante). Dans le première
scenario, il est connu que l’égoïsme des nœuds compromet les performances, mais nous mon-
trons que avec des simples modifications à opération de l’AP le système peut obtenir des
performances optimales malgré l’égoïsme des nœuds. Différemment, dans le scénario bidi-
rectionnel le fonctionnement standard d’un AP est suffisant pour garantir des performances
quasi optimales.
Mots-clés : Équilibre de Nash, Théorie des mécanismes incitatifs, les réseaux Wi-Fi, IEEE
802.11
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The Role of the Access Point in Wi-Fi Networks
with Selfish Nodes
Abstract: In Wi-Fi networks, mobile nodes compete for accessing the shared channel by
means of a random access protocol called Distributed Coordination Function (DCF), which
is long term fair. But recent drivers allow users to configure protocol parameters differently
from their standard values in order to break the protocol fairness and obtain a larger share
of the available bandwidth at the expense of other users. This motivates a game theoretical
analysis of DCF.
Previous studies have already modeled access to a shared wireless channel in terms of
non-cooperative games among the nodes, but they have mainly considered ad hoc mode op-
eration. In this paper we consider the role of the Access Point (AP) in infrastructure mode
operation, for mitigating or discouraging such malicious behaviors. Solving a mechanism
design problem, we use the AP as a network coordinator, for encouraging node strategies
which maximize a global utility function. We analyze both unidirectional and bidirectional
(uplink and downlink) traffic scenarios. In the first one it is known that nodes selfishness
jeopardize performance, but we show that simple changes to AP operation can let the sys-
tem achieve optimal performance in spite of nodes selfishness. Instead for the bidirectional
scenario the legacy behaviour of an AP is sufficient to guarantee quasi optimal performance.
Key-words: Nash equilibrium, Mechanism design, Wi-fi networks, IEEE 802.11
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1 Introduction
The problem of resource sharing in IEEE 802.11 [1] networks is addressed by the Medium
Access Protocol (MAC) according to the carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance
(CSMA/CA) paradigm. The protocol relies on random deferments of packet transmissions,
distributely computed by each contending station, in order to avoid synchronized accesses
to the channel. In fact, simultaneous transmissions interfere and result in the loss of the
transmitted frames.
The distributed protocol is in principle fair, because in long term each station receives
the same number of access opportunities. Nevertheless it has been observed that cards
produced by different vendors (and certified by the Wi-Fi alliance [2]) experience different
performance. In many cases, such different behaviors have been recognized as a consequence
of malicious settings of the MAC parameters [3], whose configuration is often easily available
to end users thanks to open-source drivers. Since the MAC protocol regulates the resource
repartition among multiple users in a distributed manner, selfish nodes gain more resources
at the expense of other users.
Resource sharing in Wi-Fi networks have often been modeled in terms of non-cooperative
game among the stations. Most of these approaches assume that the station utility function
is expressed by the node throughput or related to this performance figure. In [5], it has been
shown that a utility function equal to the throughput may lead to a Nash equilibrium in
which stations do not defer their transmission anymore. This situation creates a resource
collapse, because all stations transmit simultaneously thus destroying all packet transmis-
sions. More complex utility functions combining throughput and costs related to collision
rates [5, 6] or to energy consumptions [7] lead to different equilibria, but at the same time
they appear less natural. Distributed mechanisms to drive the the system to socially good
operation point have also been proposed [5].
In relation to existing literature our work has two main novel contributions. First, we
explicitly consider infrastructure network scenarios, in which n greedy mobile nodes compete
for accessing the Internet through a common Access Point (AP). While each node tries to
maximize each utility, the access point may be configured by the network administrator in
order to counteract nodes selfishness. We show that this approach is promising, in fact we
are able to design simple mechanisms can that can be deployed at the AP and can guarantee
optimal global performance. The second main contribution is that we do not only study the
unidirectional scenario, where users simply need to upload some information and so want to
maximize their uploading rate, but we consider also a bidirectional scenario in which user
uplink traffic generates downlink traffic from the Internet. In this case the users is interested
to maximize at the same time its uploading and downloading rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the DCF
operations and the node strategy model ; section 3 proposes some punishment strategies
for imposing collision costs in case of unidirectional traffic ; section 4 analyzes the case of
coexistence between uplink and downlink streams ; finally, some conclusions are drawn in
section 5.
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2 DCF Operations and Models
We assume that the reader is familiar with the IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination
Function (DCF) and its performance evaluation. Thus, we briefly summarize the protocol
operation and the modeling approaches used for our game formulation.
In DCF, a station with a new data packet to be transmitted monitors channel activity.
If the channel is idle for a period called Distributed InterFrame Space (DIFS), the station
transmits. The receiving station signals the successful reception by replying with an acknow-
ledgment frame (ACK). The ACK is transmitted at the end of the data packet reception, and
within a period of time called Short InterFrame Space (SIFS). The SIFS duration is shorter
than the DIFS one, to impede that other stations trying to access the channel may interfere
with the ACK transmission. If the transmitting station does not receive the ACK within
a specified ACK timeout, it reschedules the packet transmission after a random interval
of time, using the backoff rules described in what follows. Stations revealing the corrupted
frame on the channel wait for an Extended Interframe Space (EIFS) before resuming the
channel access procedure.
DCF employs a technique called collision avoidance to reduce the probability that two
or more competing stations simultaneously transmit and hence cause packet corruption.
Whenever the channel is sensed busy, the station continues to monitor the channel until it is
idle for a DIFS. At this point, rather than immediately transmitting, the station schedules
the packet transmission after a random time interval called backoff1. For efficiency reasons,
the backoff interval is expressed as an integer number of backoff slots. The number of waiting
slots is called backoff counter and is uniformly chosen in the range (0, w−1), where w is the
contention window. The backoff counter is decremented as long as the channel is sensed idle,
frozen when a transmission is detected on the channel, and reactivated when the channel
is again sensed idle for more than a DIFS. The station transmits when the backoff counter
reaches 0. The range in which the counter is extracted (i.e. w) is an adaptive parameter,
which follows a truncated exponential increment law (doubling from CWmin up to CWmax),
according to the number of consecutive failed transmissions.
Although DCF is based on the backoff process previously described, it has been shown [9]
that it can be accurately modeled as a persistent slotted access protocol. When all stations
are permanently in contention, that is when they all have always at least one frame in
the transmission buffer, the interval between the end of activity on the channel and the
next access is always equivalent to a entire number of idle backoff slots. Considering a
nonuniform scale for slots, in which each slot represents either an idle backoff slot or an
activity period plus the final DIFS time, the behavior of the protocol can be summarized by
a single parameter τ , representing the probability that a tagged station accesses the channel
during a generic channel slot :
τ =
1
1 + E[b]
(1)
1 A random backoff is also extracted between consecutive packet transmissions.
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where E[b] is the average backoff interval, that can be derived as a function of the average
contention window, which in turns depend on the collision probability. Specifically, the equi-
valent channel access probability τ of a legacy station experiencing a collision probability p
is given by :
τ = f(p) =

2(1−pR+1)
1−pR+1+(1−p)
PR
i=0 p
iW (i)
0 ≤ p < 1
2(R+1)
1+
PR
i=0W (i)
p = 1
(2)
where R is the retry limit employed in the network and W (i) is the contention window at
the i− th retry stage (i.e. W (i) = min{2iCWmin, CWmax}).
A very obvious way for differentiating station performance is the adoption of nonuniform
contention window settings. In fact, stations employing lower contention windows will pro-
babilistically expire their backoff counter more often and will transmit more packets than
the competing stations. Thus, we assume that the strategy of each selfish user i is repre-
sented by the selection of the contention window ranges or equivalently its channel access
probability.
3 Unidirectional traffic scenario
In this section we consider the application scenario referred in most of the related litera-
ture, according to which only uplink data streams are present. In particular a fixed number
of mobile stations (say it n) transmit to a single Access Point (AP). It is quite natural to
consider that a selfish mobile station would like to maximize its uploading rate. For this
purpose we assume that each station i can arbitrarily set its channel access probability τi.
The set of strategies is then [0, 1]n and we define an outcome of the game a set of strategies
taken by the players, then a vector τ = (τ1, τ2, · · · , τn) ∈ [0, 1]n. Being that in our case all
the players are homogeneous, the equilibria we are going to define are invariant to player
permutations. For this reason we define two outcomes τa and τ b equivalent if they can be
obtained one from the other through an opportune permutation of the indexes and we write
τa ∼ τ b. We denote a class of equivalent outcomes as {τ̃}, where τ̃ is an ordered vector,
i.e. a vector with increasing component (τ̃1 ≤ τ̃2 ≤ · · · τ̃n). If A is a set of ordered vectors,
then {A} denotes the union of the classes of equivalence of the vectors in A.
Station i experiences collisions during its own transmissions, when at least one of the
competing nodes transmits in the same slot. This happens with probability pi = 1−
∏
j 6=i(1−
τj). Note that the product Pidle = (1− τi)(1− pi) is the probability that no station accesses
the channel in a given slot and does not depend on the index i = 1, 2, · · ·n. Following [8],
we can express the uplink throughput Siu for the i-th station as :
Siu =
τi(1− pi)P
Pidleσ + [1− Pidle]T
(3)
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where P is the frame payload which is assumed to be fixed, while σ and T are, respectively,
the empty and the busy slot duration2, so that the denominator is the expected slot duration
(E[Tslot]).
We define the utility function Ji for the mobile station i equal to its uploading rate, then:
Ji = Siu. (4)
3.1 Nash equilibria
The following remark will be useful to characterizes Nash equilibria and identify Pareto
optimal outcomes.
Remark 3.1 In general player i utility is a function of the whole set of strategies (τ ), but it
is constant and equal to 0 if a) pi = 1, i.e. if at least one of the other player is transmitting
with probability 1 (∃j | τj = 1), or if b) τi = 0. In all the other cases Ji is strictly increasing
in user i strategy τi and strictly decreasing in other users strategies. As a consequence, if
τ ∈ [0, 1)n, then Ji < Jj if and only if τi < τj
In [5] the authors study the Nash equilibria of this game and they prove the following
result that we show here for the sake of completeness.
Proposition 3.1 The Nash equilibria of the game described above are all and only the
vectors of strategies τ , such that ∃ i ∈ 1, 2, · · ·n | τi = 1 .
Proof The result is an immediate consequence of remark 3.1.
We observe that we can distinguish two different set of Nash equilibria. If there is only
a single station i transmitting with probability 1, this station achieves an uplink rate equal
to Siu = P (1 − pi)/T = Cu(1 − pi), where Cu is the uplink capacity. All the other stations
are not able to transmit Sju = 0 for j 6= i. This set of strategies is {(x, 1),x ∈ [0, 1)n−1}. In
particular for (0, 0, · · · , 0, 1) the single station transmitting is able to achieve the maximum
throughput Cu. If there are two or more stations transmitting with probability 1, then the
channel is entirely wasted because of collisions and Shu = 0,∀h. This set of strategies is
then {(x, 1, 1),x ∈ [0, 1]n−2}. Performance at these Nash Equilibria are very poor. In what
follows we design a different game, changing the behaviour of the Access Point, in order to
improve global performance.
3.2 Mechanism Design
In order to improve the performance achieved in presence of selfish mobile stations, we
introduce some incentive mechanisms by adding new simple functionalities to the Access
Point. As a preliminary step, we need to identify desirable outcomes from the global point
2We are implicitly considering a basic access scheme, with EIFS=ACK_Timeout +DIFS, which corres-
ponds to have a fixed busy slot duration in both the cases of successful transmission and collision.
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of view. A natural choice is to look at outcomes that maximize the global utility, i.e. the
aggregate uplink rate
∑
i Ji =
∑
i S
i
u. It is easy to derive that, given the probabilistic access
protocol, the maximum uplink rate can be achieved only when there is a single station
transmitting with probability 1 and all the other stations are silent. These are the NE
outcomes of the type {(0, 0, · · · 0, 1)}. We observe that they are Pareto optimal outcomes.
We remember that a Pareto optimal outcome is one such that no-one could be made better
off by changing the vector of strategies without making someone else worse off. At the same
time, the outcomes {(0, 0, · · · 0, 1)} appear to be extremely unfair. This motivates us to look
for outcomes, that maximize the uplink rate under a fairness constraint. We want then to
consider as social utility the following function :
JS = min
i=1,···n
Ji.
Proposition 3.2 There is a unique outcome that maximizes JS and such outcome is ho-
mogeneous, i.e. τ ∗ = (τ∗, τ∗, ...τ∗), and Pareto optimal.
Proof First we observe that the social utility is null (JS = 0) for the sets of strategies
{(0,x),x ∈ [0, 1]n−1} and {(x, 1),x ∈ [0, 1]n−1}, while it is strictly positive otherwise,
i.e. for the set of strategies A={x,x ∈ (0, 1)n} (every player has a positive uploading rate).
We can then restrict our attention to A.
Let τ be a non-homogeneous outcome in A, we prove that social utility cannot be
maximum for τ . Without loss of generality we consider that τ is an ordered vector, then
1 > τn > τ1 > 0 and JS(τ ) = J1(τ ). Let us consider τ ′n, such that τ1 < τ ′n < τn, the outcome
τ ′ = (τ1, τ2, · · · , τn−1, τ ′n) has higher social utility than τ . In fact JS(τ ′) = mini Ji(τ ′) =
J1(τ ′) > J1(τ ) = JS(τ ). The second equality follows from τ1 being the smallest element
in τ ′ and inequality from player n having reduced its access probability from τn to τ ′n (see
Remark 3.1).
If we focus on homogeneous outcomes, we can consider the single variable function
JS((τ, τ, · · · , τ)). The sign of its derivative is equal to the sign of
−T − σ
T
(1− τ)n + n(1− τ)− n+ 1.
We can then observe that there is a unique point of maximum of the single variable function
JS((τ, τ, · · · , τ)) -say it τ∗- and then a unique point of maximum of the function JS(τ ) for
τ ∗ = (τ∗, τ∗, · · · , τ∗).
Finally we prove Pareto optimality. Say τ an allocation different from τ ∗ with at least
a player better off than in τ ∗. This allocation is necessarily non-homogenous (among the
homogeneous allocations every player utility is maximized at τ ∗). Let j = argminh Jh(τ ),
then JS(τ ) = Jj(τ ). From the uniqueness of JS maximum, it follows that JS(τ ) < JS(τ ∗) =
Jj(τ ∗). Then player j has a lower utility at τ than at τ ∗ and τ ∗ is a Pareto outcome.
Remark 3.2 The outcome τ ∗ is not a Nash Equilibrium, in fact every player can increase
its utility by increasing its own access probability.
RR n° 6737
8 Giarrè, Neglia & Tinnirello
In [8] it has been shown that the optimal value τ ∗ can be approximated for T >> σ as :
τ∗ =
1
n
√
T/2σ
.
Incidentally we observe that, given this definition of the global utility, both price of
anarchy and price of stability3 have infinite value for this game. In fact in all the NEs there
is at least one player with throughput equal to 0, so JS(τNE) = 0
We want to design the game so that τ∗ is a NE. This case requires some punishment
policies in order to prevent that each station i accesses the channel with probability τi =
1. Punishment policies proposed in previous works are usually based on jamming. A jam
signal is a short burst sent on the channel in order to interfere with another transmission
and creating an artificial collision. The responsibility of jamming the packets is collectively
carried out by all the nodes in the system in order to introduce a uniform cost for all
transmissions [5].
Indeed, since we are referring to infrastructure mode operation, where an AP is present,
we can design a different punishment strategy, whose responsibility is given to the AP
only. Specifically, for saving energy and avoiding distributed cost assignments, we create
artificial collisions by simply suppressing some ACK transmissions originated by the AP.
Since the AP is the common receiver for all the stations, suppressing the ACKs from the
AP side corresponds to triggering ACK timeouts at the station side, which are interpreted
as collisions. We propose the following threshold scheme : if a generic station i has access
probability τi higher than the a given value τ̄ , the AP drops an ACK frame transmission
with probability min{αi(τi − τ̄), 1}.
In this case, the utility function Ji of a given station i can be expressed as :
Ji =

τi(1−pi)
E[Tslot]
0 < τi < τ̄
τi(1−pi)[1−αi(τi−τ̄)]
E[Tslot]
τ̄ ≤ τi < τ̄ + 1/α
0 τ̄ + 1/α ≤ τi < 1
(5)
where E[Tslot] = Pidleσ + [1 − Pidle]T is equal to the denominator in equation (3) and we
recall that Pidle = (1−τi)(1−pi). According to the previous expression, for τi ≤ τ̄ the utility
function Ji is an increasing function of τi, while for τi ≤ τ̄ its slope depends on the α setting.
By selecting an α value which corresponds to a negative derivative for τ̄ < τi < τ̄ + 1/α, the
utility function is maximized for τi = τ̄ .
We can then prove the following result.
3We remind that the price of anarchy is the ratio between the global utility of the optimal coordinated
outcome (i.e. when users are not selfish), and of the worst NE. The price of stability has a similar definition
but it consider the best NE rather than the worst one.
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Proposition 3.3 The outcome τ∗ is a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of the game, when
the ACK suppression scheme indicated above is implemented with:
τ̄ = τ∗,
α ≥ 1
τ∗(1 + τ∗(−1 + TT−(T−s)(1−τ∗)n−1 ))
. (6)
Proof First we observe that τ ∗ is a NE. In fact, whatever player we consider, say it player i,
Remark 3.1 guarantees that for τi < τ∗ Ji decreases as τi decreases. For τ∗ < τi < τ∗ + 1/α
inequality (6) guarantees that Ji decreases as τi increases until it does not reach the value
0. For τ > τ∗+ 1/α, the punishment strategy implies Ji = 0. Then deviating from τ ∗ is not
convenient for player i.
Second, it can be observed that the punishment strategy decreases the social utility JS(τ )
for τ ∈ (τ∗, 1]n and keeps it unchanged otherwise, so that the Proposition 3.2 holds also
under the punishment strategy.
We observe that in this new game the outcomes {(x, 1),x ∈ [0, 1)n−1} are no more NEs.
Nevertheless the outcomes {(x, 1, 1),x ∈ [0, 1]n−2} are still NEs, where all user utilities are
zero. Then, while the price of stability is equal to 1 (there is a NE with optimal performance),
the price of anarchy of the game is still infinite. At the same time these other NEs are not
Pareto optimal, so that the outcome τ∗ looks a more reasonable operation point.
4 Bidirectional traffic scenario
Nodes belonging to an infrastructure network are usually involved into two different data
streams : on one side, they need to upload traffic to the AP, which is connected to exter-
nal networks ; on the other side, they need to download traffic from the external networks
through the AP. The first data stream is usually referred as uplink data stream, while the
second one is usually referred as downlink data stream. In this section, we define a utility
function which takes into account both the streams and we analyze the impact of such a
definition on the network equilibria.
We assume that the AP behaves as a legacy DCF station with saturated downlink traffic.
Thus, it randomly defers its transmissions according to backoff counter extractions performed
in the range [0, w − 1], where w follows the updating law described in section 2.
Let τ be the vector of the mobile station strategies τ1, τ2, · · · τn. For a given station i, the
strategies of the competing stations can be summarized into the probability pi defined in the
previous section. This parameter is the probability that no mobile station transmits in the
current slot. Thus, from the station point of view, the vector strategy τ can be represented
by the couple of values (τi, pi). Since in this case the AP contends for the channel too, the
overall collision probability suffered by station i results 1 − (1 − pi)(1 − τAP ), where τAP
is the channel access probability employed by the AP, which is function of the perceived
collision probability pAP according to (2). We can evaluate the AP collision probability as
RR n° 6737
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a function of the vector strategy τ or as a function of the a generic couple (τi, pi) :
pAP = 1−
n∏
i=1
(1− τi) = 1− (1− pi)(1− τi)
Moreover, the probability that a channel slot is idle is the probability that neither the
stations, nor the AP transmit on the channel, i.e. Pidle = (1−pAP )(1−τAP ). Assuming that
the AP equally shares the downlink throughput among the stations, we can readily express
the uplink throughput Siu and the downlink throughput Sid for the i-th station as :
Siu(τi, pi) =
τi(1− pi)(1− τAP )P
Pidleσ + [1− Pidle]T
(7)
Sid(τi, pi) =
1
n
τAP (1− pAP )P
Pidleσ + [1− Pidle]T
(8)
where both pAP and τAP = f(pAP ) depend on the couple (τi, pi).
We define the utility function Ji for the mobile station i as :
Ji = min{Siu, Sid} (9)
The rationale of such a definition is the assumption that the station applications require
bandwidth on both directions, and they cannot work whenever the throughput on a given
direction (either uplink or downlink) is zero.
4.1 Nash equilibria
From the utility definition above, it is evident that the strategies {(x, 1),x ∈ [0, 1)n−1}
are not Nash equilibria anymore. In fact, when one station employs a channel access pro-
bability equal to 1, the AP collides with probability pAP = 1, thus resulting in a downlink
throughput Sid equal to 0. Thus, the station is incentivated to reduce its transmission pro-
bability to a value lower than 1. Conversely, the strategies {(x, 1, 1),x ∈ [0, 1]n−2} are still
Nash equilibria, because for a given station i the utility function is fixed to 0, regardless of
its specific strategy τi. The price of anarchy is then infinite also in this case. But, differently
from the unidirectional traffic scenario, the price of stability is finite (and equal to 1), in
fact we are going to prove that there is another NE where all the stations achieve a non-null
utility.
We first derive the best response strategy of a generic player, e.g. player i. For a given
pi 6= 0, Sid is a monotonic decreasing function of τi, starting from Sid(0) > 0, and Siu(τi) is
a monotonic increasing function of τi, starting from Siu(0) = 0. Thus, the utility function
Ji is maximized for τ
(br)
i ∈ (0, 1) such that Siu(τ
(br)
i ) = S
i
d(τ
(br)
i ). It follows that τ
∗
i is the
solution of the following implicit equation :
τ
(br)
i =
τAP
n− (n− 1)τAP
=
f
(
1− (1− pi)
(
1− τ (br)i
))
n− (n− 1)f
(
1− (1− pi)
(
1− τ (br)i
)
.
) (10)
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It can be shown that the previous equation has a single solution τ∗i in the range (0, 1), which
can be numerically solved in a few fixed point iterations.
Proposition 4.1 The balanced strategy vector τ |τi = τ∗ = f(1−(1−τ
∗)n)
n−(n−1)f(1−(1−τ∗)n) ,∀i is the
only Nash equilibrium in [0, 1)n of the game described above.
Proof The strategy vector (τ∗, τ∗, · · · , τ∗) is a Nash equilibrium as an immediate conse-
quence of (10) for pi = (1 − τ∗i )n−1. In fact the equation can be read as a mutual best
response. Since equation (10) has a single solution, it exists a unique symmetric NE stra-
tegy. Since (1 − pi)(1 − τi) = (1 − pj)(1 − τj),∀i, j, the right hand of the best response
equation is the same for all the stations. This excludes the existence of asymmetric Nash
equilibria.
Proposition 4.2 The NE (τ∗, τ∗, · · · , τ∗) with τ∗ solution of equation (10) for pi = (1 −
τ∗)n−1 is Pareto optimal.
The proof is similar to that of proposition 3.3. The NE optimizes the social utility defined
in the previous sections (assuming to operate with a legacy AP), thus leading to a stability
price equal to 1.
Note that the parameter τ∗, which characterizes the Nash equilibrium strategy, only
depends on the number of stations n and it is not affected either by the PHY layer parameters
(such as backoff slot duration, interframe spaces, etc.) or by the frame length. We verified
via simulation that, starting from any strategy vector τ , the station strategies converge
to the NE (τ∗, τ∗, · · · , τ∗) in a few steps, whenever strategy adjustments based on best
response criteria are employed simultaneously by the stations. This result is different from
the optimal channel access probability derived in [8]. In fact, the result in [8] is based on the
assumption that all stations use a fixed channel access probability, i.e. a fixed contention
window. Conversely, in our scenario the AP adopts the standard exponential backoff scheme,
thus adapting its contention window to the level of congestion perceived in the network.
This adaptability allows the mobile stations to tune their optimal strategy regardless of the
transmission times and backoff duration.
4.2 Mechanism Design
We could argue that the system performance can be further improved by also tuning the
AP contention window to a fixed value. In these conditions, since τAP does not depend on
τ anymore, the best response for all the stations is equal to τ+ = τAPn−(n−1)τAP and the NE
equilibrium point in (0, 1)n becomes (τ+, τ+, · · · τ+). By maximizing the NE equilibrium
utility as a function of the parameter τAP , it can be found a single optimal τ∗AP , that for
T  σ can be approximated as :
τ∗AP =
1√
2T/σ
.
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Note that the optimal τAP is not proportional to 1/n as in [8], because the AP downlink
throughput corresponds to the aggregation of n flows, whose bandwidths is equal to the
uplink throughput perceived by each station at the NE point. Such a point corresponds to
τ+ = 1
n
√
2T/σ−(n−1)
, which depends on both n and the parameters T and σ as in [8].
We verified via simulation that the payoffs obtained for the NE in (0, 1)n with a legacy
AP are about the same payoffs obtained with a fixed τAP value. Thus, since in the first case
the equilibrium strategies do not depend on T and σ, the use of a legacy AP is a simpler
solution for incentivating the global utility of the system.
5 Conclusions
In this work, we considered the AP role in a WiFi network of selfish mobile nodes. In case
of uplink traffic, we derived a simple punishment mechanism, implemented at the AP side,
for discouraging malicious behaviors and force utility optimizations. We also considered the
case of bidirectional traffic flows by defining utility functions which take into account both
the uplink and the downlink throughput. We proved that, in this scenario, node strategies
can easily converge to a Nash equilibrium which maximizes the global utility and equally
shares the total downlink and uplink bandwith. More interesting, such equilibrium strategies
are not affected by PHY layer parameters and only depend on the number of contending
stations. Numerical results, not included in this extended abstract, will be provided in the
final version of the paper.
Références
[1] IEEE Standard 802.11 - 1999 ; Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Phy-
sical Layer (PHY) Specifications ; November 1999.
[2] Wi-Fi Alliance, www.wi-fi.org
[3] G. Bianchi, A. Di Stefano, C. Giaconia, L. Scalia, G. Terrazzino, I. Tinnirello, “Experi-
mental assessment of the backoff behavior of commercial IEEE 802.11b network cards”,
Proc. of IEEE Infocom 2007, May 2007, Anchorage, pp. 1181-1189.
[4] S.W. Kim, B.S. Kim, Y. Fang, “Downlink and uplink resource allocation in IEEE 802.11
wireless LANs”, Proc. of IEEE Conf. on Vehicular Technology, Jan. 2005, Dallas, vol.
54, pp. 320-327.
[5] M. Cagalj, S. Ganeriwal, I. Aad, J.P. Hubaux, “On selfish behavior in CSMA/CA net-
works”, Proc. of IEEE Infocom, March 2005, Miami, vol. 4, pp. 2513-2524.
[6] L. Chen, S.H. Low, J. Doyle, “Contention Control : A Game-Theoretic Approach”, Proc.
of IEEE Conf. On Decision and Control, Dec. 2007, New Orleans, pp. 3428-3434.
[7] G. Zhang, H. Zhang, “Modelling IEEE 802.11 DCF in wireless LANs as a dynamic game
with incompletely information”, Proc. of Conf. on Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia
Networks, Jan. 2008, Mumbai, pp. 215-218.
INRIA
The Role of the Access Point in Wi-Fi Networks with Selfish Nodes 13
[8] G. Bianchi, “Performance Analysis of the IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Func-
tion”, IEEE Journal of Selected Areas in Communication, vol. 18, no. 3, pp.535-547,
March 2000.
[9] G. Bianchi, I. Tinnirello “Remarks on IEEE 802.11 Performance Analysis”, IEEE Com-
munication Letters, Vol. 9, no. 8, August 2005.
Table des matières
1 Introduction 3
2 DCF Operations and Models 4
3 Unidirectional traffic scenario 5
3.1 Nash equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2 Mechanism Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4 Bidirectional traffic scenario 9
4.1 Nash equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2 Mechanism Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5 Conclusions 12
RR n° 6737
Unité de recherche INRIA Sophia Antipolis
2004, route des Lucioles - BP 93 - 06902 Sophia Antipolis Cedex (France)
Unité de recherche INRIA Futurs : Parc Club Orsay Université - ZAC des Vignes
4, rue Jacques Monod - 91893 ORSAY Cedex (France)
Unité de recherche INRIA Lorraine : LORIA, Technopôle de Nancy-Brabois - Campus scientifique
615, rue du Jardin Botanique - BP 101 - 54602 Villers-lès-Nancy Cedex (France)
Unité de recherche INRIA Rennes : IRISA, Campus universitaire de Beaulieu - 35042 Rennes Cedex (France)
Unité de recherche INRIA Rhône-Alpes : 655, avenue de l’Europe - 38334 Montbonnot Saint-Ismier (France)
Unité de recherche INRIA Rocquencourt : Domaine de Voluceau - Rocquencourt - BP 105 - 78153 Le Chesnay Cedex (France)
Éditeur
INRIA - Domaine de Voluceau - Rocquencourt, BP 105 - 78153 Le Chesnay Cedex (France)
http://www.inria.fr
ISSN 0249-6399
